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Chapter 2 
Regionalization in the Tianxia? 
Introduction 
Continuity and Change in 
China's Foreign Policy 
FengZhang 
In the traditional Chinese worldview there was no conception of «region." Instead, 
the distinctive concept used by the Chinese was Tianxia, or the surrounding world. 
Tianxia has been commonly translated into English as "all under heaven." Such 
literal translation is problematic, for in practice, Chinese rulers, by claiming to be 
"overlords of the Tianxia," did not intend to Jay their suzerainty over the entire 
lmO'iVD. world (Gan 2003, 508). Rather, their Tianxia was more circumscribed, 
generally referring to the Chinese empire and the adjacent areas with which the 
Chinese interacted-roughly corresponding to what we today lmow as Northeast 
and Southeast Asia and parts of Central Asia. 
"Regionalization in the Tianxia" is therefore somewhat of a contradiction. Yet 
we can still conceive of China's relations with its neighbors as having constituted 
a distinctive regional order, or the "Tianxia order" as some Chinese scholars have 
called it (Zhao 2005; Gao 2003). The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the nature 
of this order from the Chinese side by analyzing the foreign policy motivations 
and strategy of Chinese rulers. For the purposes of brevity, this investigation is 
limited to the early Ming dynasty (1368--1424). This makes good sense for at least 
two reasons. First, for the first time in Chinese history, the early Ming developed 
a single pattern for the bureaucratic management of all foreign relations which 
has often been called the "tribute system" (Wills 1984, 14; Fairbank and Teng 
1941,137; Mancall1984, 13). This period is thus one of the most likely periods in 
Chinese history when salient features of Chinese attempts to socialize its neighbors 
might be found. Second, the early Ming saw a consolidation and expansion of 
Chinese power. Since we are interested in the possible socialization impact of 
contemporary China on regional order, looking back at a period when China was 
illdisputably the greatest power ill the systein might be particularly instructive. 
The chapter begins with a conceptual discussion on imperial Chinese foreign 
policy. The second section examines early Millg policies toward Korea, Japan, and 
the Mongols and asks what kind of "community of practice" emerged between 
China and its neighbors. The third section discusses the contemporary implication 
. 
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of traditional Chinese foreign policy, focusing on the aspect of socialization. 
Socialization was a salient aspect in imperial Chinese foreign policy; it may yet 
again become prominent as Chinese elites begin to "rethink China" and develop a 
distinctive set of Chinese ideas for managing international affairs. 
Conceptualizing Imperial Chinese foreign policy 
"'Traditional China's foreign relations" was once a thriving field in the historical 
scholarship. The research efforts initiated by John King Fairbank from the 1940s 
to the 1960s-particularly Fairbank's "tribute system" and "Chinese world order" 
thesis-have had enduring influence on our understanding of premodern Chinese 
foreign policy (Fairbank 1942, 1953, 1968). Some international relations scholars 
have also viewed the tribute system as the fundamental institution of the traditional 
Bast Asian "international society" (Zhang 2001). Yet the tribute system is first of 
all an analytical category, "a Western invention for descriptive purposes" (Mancall 
1968, 63). It mayor may not be useful for organizing our analysis of China's 
foreign relations. In contrast to customary practice, this chapter will break away 
from the tribute system paradigm dominating the study of East Asian diplomatic 
history. In fact, deconstructing the tribute system as a historical institution might 
shed more light on the nature of Chinese foreign policy. 
If the tribute system is removed, what is left? Onemightbeginby conceptualizing 
the ends and means of imperial China's foreign policy. A necessary starting 
point is to examine the implication of sinocentrism-the Chinese conception of 
their centrality and superiority in the known world (the classic statement is still 
in Fairbank 1968). Such a conception is said to have led Chinese rulers to view 
foreign countries as inferior tributary/vassal states in a China~centered international 
hierarchy and to require them to pay proper tributes to the Chinese court in the 
form of local products. But it must be noted that this is only a generalization. 
In practice the Chinese did not always think this way, especially when dealing 
with powerful foreign rivals (Rossabi 1983). The assumption of sinocentrism is 
therefore useful only during certain periods in Chinese history. We can, however, 
expect its analytical utility during the early Ming. By the time of the Ming-the 
last Han Chinese dynasty-sinocentrism and other cultural assumptions must 
have been well developed and passed down to China's ruling elites. In addition, 
sinocentrism might have been given strong behavioral expressions in the early 
Ming since this period also witnessed a new assertion of Chinese power. 
What, then, might be the effect of sinocentrism on early Ming foreign poliCY? 
Sinocentrism would lead to a sinocentric identity on the part of Chinese rulers-
the understanding of China as the center of the world surrounded by the "four 
foreigners" (si yz), and as the universal empire and the superior polity that deserves 
the submission as its vassals from other countries. Chinese rulers would therefore 
try to satisfy China's identity needs as the only central, superior, and sovereign 
entity in the surrounding world. "Sovereign" here means that China had the right 
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to determine the policies of other countries towards it. Chinese rulers would then 
try to install other countries as tribute-paying vassals and make them acknowledge 
Chinese superiority in foreign affairs. This can be fairly called China's political 
domination of controlling other countries' foreign policies toward it (Gan 2003, 
49Q..505). 
Further, the sinocentric identity needs might be intrinsically linked with the 
legitimacy needs in imperial politics. If sinocen'trism was entrenched deep enough 
and becomes a political ideology of some sort, we can expect Chinese rulers to 
invoke it as the tradition of China's role in the world. This would compel them to 
realize a sinocentric world order in order to satisfy the ideological requirement of 
governing China. Its attainment would therefore partly constitute the Mandate of 
Heaven-the legitimacy basis of imperial rule. If the rulers wanted to claim the 
Mandate of Heaven in governing China, they must be able to demonstrate, among 
other things, that they were indeed the Son of Heaven (tianzlj and the ""overlord of 
the Tianxia" or make it seem so. 
Chinese rulers would want to create a sinocentric world order by socializing 
foreign rulers into accepting its centrality and superiority. Socialization is a process 
of identity- and interest-formation (Wendt 1999, 170). The ideal outcome of 
Chinese socialization was for foreign rulers to internalize the sinocentric norm and 
serve as China's tributaries voluntarily. To this end Chinese rulers would employ a 
persuasion strategy to achieve political domination-a strategy of constructing the 
identity and interests of other countries as China's tributaries through a normative 
discourse of Chinese superiority. If this could be successful, a '''community of 
practice", informed above all by sinocentric norms and regularized through 
tributary relations, would conceivably emerge. In practice, however, East Asian 
politics during the early Ming fell short of this ideal, despite apparent tributary 
practices between China and its neighbors. 
But realizing the sinocentric identity underpinned by legitimacy needs could 
not be the only end of imperial Chinese foreign policy. Some scholars have been 
misled by the somewhat unique notion of sinocentrism and overlooked other 
equally important foreign policy objectives that Chinese rulers attended to. 
Security is among the most important such objectives. Faced with security threats 
on the frontier of their empire, what would Chinese rulers do? This is a complex 
question that defies simple answers. Some hypotheses, however, can be derived 
from realist theories of international relations, especially if we focus on the early 
Ming, a period during which Chinese rulers were confident about their military 
capabilities as well as their material and cultural superiority. 
Realism dictates that the primary means to obtain desired outcomes are to 
threaten punishment or offer a side payment. Three strategies therefore appear 
prominent in a realist world: war, blackmail, and inducement. War is the 
straightforward strategy for eliminating security threats. Moreover, for a powerful 
regime such as the early Ming, preventive war might also appear an attractive 
option--employing war to prevent the rise of threatening powers. This, in fact, 
largely explains early Ming China's repeated campaigns into the Mongolian 
.. 
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steppe. Blackmail and inducement are less costly strategies than war. China might 
threaten to take some undesirable action unless the target country complied with 
its security request. Or it might hope to gain other countries' security cooperation 
by promising political and economic benefits. Indeed, early Ming rulers, especially 
the YongJe emperor (r.1403-1424), frequently bestowed political titles, economic 
gifts. and trade privileges to foreign rulers. 
Such a framework, drawing on both constructivist and realist theories of 
international relations, shows that although sinocentrism is a noteworthy notion, 
persuasion and socialization that might logically follow from it are not the whole 
story of Chinese foreign policy in practice. Because socialization might fail, 
and because China also had to confront external security threats, Chinese rulers 
must also employ other strategies such as war, blackmail, and inducement when 
necessary. If, through persuasion Chinese rulers could socialize foreign rulers into 
internalizing sinocentrism and becoming China's loyal vassals, then the strategies 
of war, blackmail, and inducement would be of no use since such a high degree 
of socialization would have prevented security threats from arising in the first 
place. But if socialization did not produce its intended effect, we should expect 
Chinese rulers to employ more power-political means to ensure the security of 
their empire. 
Early Ming foreign policy in practice 
The chapter will now briefly discuss early Ming China's policies toward Korea, 
Japan, and the Mongols to evaluate the usefulness of the above framework. The 
early Ming in fact tried to initiate tributary relations with an unprecedented large 
number of polities in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Narrowing the focus to Sino-
Korean, Sino-Japanese, and Sino-Mongolian relations makes good sense because 
they encompass a wide range of relations between China and its neighbors, 
from the most cooperative (Sino-Korean relations) to the most difficult (Sino-
Mongolian relations). They are in this sense "representative" of China's overall 
foreign relations; by examining them one will not miss significant variations in 
Chinese foreign policy. 
Sino-Korean relations 
Korea, along with Annam (Vietnam), Champa, and Japan, was among the first 
countries that the founding Hongwu emperor (r. 1368-1398) of the M1ng dynasty 
tried to initiate tributary relations with. In January 1369, Hongwu dispatched 
envoys to the Koryo court to proclaim the founding of his regime. His imperial 
rescript conveyed two messages. First, it emphasized the transfer of the Mandate 
of Heaven, the basis of imperial legitimacy, from the previous Yuan dynasty to the 
Ming. Second, it pointed out the historical precedents in Sino-Korean relations 
: '0--
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and implied that Korea should continue the "tradition" of tributary submission to 
the Chinese emperor (WU 1980, 13; Clark 1978, 36). 
Korea's tributary submission was important to Hongwu because, having just 
seized power by force from the Yuan, he had to build up legitimacy for his new rule 
(Huang 1994). It was paramount for his regime to be acknowledged and supported 
both internally and externally. Internally, Hongwu initiated a series of moves to 
identify himself with the tradition of legitimate Confucian political authority by 
cultivating the symbols of Confucian rule and by suppressing the remnants of the 
heterodox origins of the Ming regime (Dreyer 1982, 66). Externally, he wanted 
to establish a sinocentric and hierarchic order with other countries serving as 
his vassals and presenting periodic tributary products. This would demonstrate 
his superiority and authority in the Tianxia, and confinn his status as the Son of 
Heaven. Positioning himself as the overlord of the surrounding world, he even sent 
envoys to offer sacrifices to the stream and mountain deities of foreign countries 
(Huang 1994, 193-6). 
Legitimacy, however, was not the only motive behind Hongwu's missions to 
Korea. The concern for security, as well as the need for legitimacy, motivated 
Hongwu's Korea policy. Even during the first ,mission the Ming envoy carried 
the task of persuading Korea to sever ties with Naghachu, the Mongol leader in 
Manchuria(Goodrich andFang 1976, 1083). Security would becomeanincreasingly 
important-and one might say obsessive-concern for Hongwu in later years. 
Such concern was well founded. The Ming was unable to annex the Liaodong 
region until 1387. Korea's geographical location means that it always had vital 
security interests in the region, and had indeed historically played an important 
role there (Ledyard 1983). Korea could damage Ming security interests either by 
directly challenging Ming power in Manchuria or allying with the Mongols or the 
Jurchens or both to balance against it. By having Korea as a tributary, Hongwu 
seemed to have hoped that this would enable him to divide and conquer the other 
wo threats in the northeast: the Mongols and the Jurchens. 
Sino-Korean relations in the first few years of the Hongwu reign were cordial, 
but were soon damaged by Koryo's 1370-1371 campaign into Liaodong. This 
campaign changed Hongwu's attitudes toward Korea for good. After 1371 he 
became increasingly suspicious of and hostile toward the Koreans. He accused the 
Korea King of bad faith as a result of the Liaodong campaign. In 1373 he got angry 
at the poor quality of Korean tribute horses. In 1374 he reduced the frequency of 
Korean missions to one every three years, perhaps as an attempt to gain Korean 
concession and'cooperation in its northeast security (Langlois 1988, 166). 
By 1380, Hongwu had become so suspicious that he "was incapable of seeing 
Korea as anything but a wayward border state which had to be intimidated in 
an effort to head off trouble" (Clark 1978, 163). Even after the new Choson 
dynasty (established in 1392) adopted a policy of acco=odation-Sadae ("serve 
the great")--toward the Ming, Hongwu was still suspicious of Korea's loyalty 
and worried about Ming security in the northeast. He withheld the new King's, 
investiture and accused Korea of a variety of wrongdoings in ~ 1393 rescript 
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(Liu et al. 2005, 31). Although the Mongols no longer posed a threat after the 
pacification ofLiaodong in 1387, the Koreans and the Jurchens were still viewed 
with suspicion and vigilance. In the last years of his reign Hongwu wanted to 
prevent Korea from threatening Ming frontier emplacements by reducing contacts 
between the Koreans and the Jurchens (Clark 1978,134-135). 
The end of the Hongwu reign brought a turning point in Sino-Korea relations. 
Hongwu had frequently tried to threaten the Koreans for security reasons. His 
successors took a much more favorable view toward Korea. Persuasion rose to 
prominence and coercive means such as blaclanail took a back seat. The Yongle 
emperor, for example, swiftly invested the Korean King in 1403. Such enthusiasm 
was largely motivated by Yongle's need for legitimacy. Because his rule was 
established through a violent struggle with the legitimate heir to the Ming throne 
(the Jianwen emperor, r. 1399-1402), Yongle had to build up the legitimacy of 
his rule, transforming himself from usurper to the rightful heir. His investiture of 
the Korean king and his enthusiastic reception of Korean missions were meant to 
be part of the process in achieving this effect Moreover, he was not as worried 
about a potential Korean threat in Liaodong as Hongwu once was, primarily 
because he waged a successful campaign of peaceful pacification of the Jurchens 
in Manchuria, displacing Korean iniluence along the way (Serruys 1955). 
Sino-Japanese relations 
The patterns of Sino-Japanese interactions were broadly similar to those of Sino-
Korean relations. Early Ming emperors tried to politically dominate Japanese 
foreign policy in areas of tributary relations and policies regarding Japanese piracy 
for essentially the same reasons: the need to demonstrate legitimacy in order to 
consolidate their political regime and a concern with security along the Chinese 
coast. They also employed the strategies of persuasion, inducement, and blackmail 
to achieve these ends. 
Hongw.u's fustmission to Japan in February 1369 invoked tributary precedents 
of the past and in effect asked for Japan's acknowledgment of his superiority and 
Japanese tribute to his court (Cheng 1981, 149; Wang 1953, 10). Like his first 
mission to Korea, this one was also an attempt to revive the sinocentric order 
believed to have been created by such great dynasties as the Han (206BC-220AD) 
and Tang (618-907) in the past. And essentially for the sarne reason: making Japan 
a tributary of the Ming would help demonstrate his legitimacy to rule China. 
Hongwu did not receive any reply from Japan. Instead, what he heard was 
news of Japanese pirates (Wako) pillaging China's Shandong peninsula (Zhang 
and Yu 2004, 6725). Greatly concerned with the Wako problem, the emperor 
sent his second mission in March 1369. This time the rescript was far harsher in 
tone. Hongwu demanded that Japan offer a proper petition to the Ming court and 
control the Wako. To that end, he threatened Japan with invasion-''to bind their 
kings with ropes," as he described (Wang 1953, 10). His envoys, however, were 
imprisoned by Prince Kanenaga in Kyushu for three months. 
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Hongwu was nevertheless willing to try diplomacy once more. In April l370, 
he sent another mission with a new and longer rescript. He at the same time advised 
the desirability of peaceful Sino-Japanese relations and warned about the serious 
consequence should Japan fail to comply with his requests. In his characteristic 
style, the rescript ended with a warning: «Be cautious so as to prolong your line of 
succession" (Wang 1953, 11). . 
The emperor must have been somewhat pleased by Kanenaga's mission to 
the Ming court in 1371, though the latter soon failed to send "'proper" tributary 
missions and increasingly defied the Ming. When Yos4imitsu of the Ashikaga 
shogunate sent a mission in 1374, Hongwu was apparently confused by Japanese 
politics. He chose to deal with Kanenaga as the ruler of Japan and reprimanded 
"illegitimate" missions from all others. 
In the next few years the emperor's attitude toward Japan steadily soured as a 
result of continuing Japanese piracy along the Chinese coast, several "'improper" 
or "'illegitimate" Japanese missions to his court, and the perception of the political 
chaos in Japan. In January 1381, for example, he became so annoyed by erratic 
Japanese missions and the worsening Wako problem. that he called the Japanese 
"stupid eastern foreigners" (Wang 1953,17). After 1381 Sino-Japanese relations 
were beyond repair. The Ming court treated Japanese missions badly in 1382, 1384, 
and 1386. In 1387, after discovering Prime Minister Hu Weiyong's alleged coup 
to overthrow his rule with the help of Japan-which was a probably fabricated 
case-Hongwu decided to completely break off relations with Japan (Zhang and 
Yu2004, 6728). Afterwards his Japan policy was solely focused on coastal defense 
against the Wako. 
A turning point, however, was reached when Yoshimitsu finally overcame 
his rivals an4 consolidated his position in Japanese politics around 1400. Before 
the Yongle emperor even sent out his envoys to announce his enthronement, 
Yoshimitsu's mission arrived in Nanjing in November 1403. Vlhat is more, the 
envoys carried a petition written in perfect Chinese literary style in which the 
Japanese shogun explicitly called himself a ''vassal'' of the Chinese emperor 
(Cheng 1981, 254; Wang 1953,24-25). This extraordinary and yet unexpected 
mission pleased YongIe greatly. 
The emperor sent a return mission one month later, during which the Chinese 
envoy completed a novel commercial agreement with the Ashikaga shogunate, 
opening the official ''tally'' trade between China and Japan. The Japanese were 
permitted to send periodic trading ventures to China under the guise of tribute-
bearing missions. Yongle was primarily motivated by his desire to control Japanese 
piracy in extending tally trade privileges to Japan, as the use of tallies gave him 
a system whereby official Japanese envoys could be readily distinguished from 
unauthorized traders and pirates (Wang 1953,38-39). But it must also be said that 
Yongle was much more active and flexible in his maritime policy than Hongwu 
had ever been, particularly in terms of his willingness to induce foreign rulers with 
material incentives. 
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During 1401-1408 Sino-Japanese relations were remarkably harmonious. 
Yoshimitsu's gestures of loyalty toward China were rare among all rulers in 
Japanese history. He was the only one that seriously tried to meet the Chinese 
request of suppressing piracy during the Ming period. YongIe, on the other hand, 
never failed to flatter and please the Japanese with material incentives. 
The harmony, however, ended with Yoshimitsu's death in 1408. Yong1e tried 
to keep the new shogun Yoshimochi as loyal and cooperative as Yoshimitsu. Yet 
except for the first couple of years, Yoshimochi was aloof and consistently rejected 
Yongle's request for tributary relations. During 1411-1417, official contact 
between China and Japan was nonexistent. Yongie, still hoping to win Japan over, 
sent back captured Japanese pirates in-1417 in a show of Chinese magnanimity. 
But his 1417 and 1418 rescripts also carried explicit threats and demonstrated his 
increasing frustration with Japan's detachment (Wang 1953, 4&--51). The emperor 
finally gave up any hope of resuming Sino~Japanese relations after Yoshimochi 
replied to decline relationship with China and deny all responsibility for Japanese 
piracy. 
Sino-Mongolian relations 
Do we see the same patterns-the strategies of persuasion, inducement, and 
blackmail for the ends oflegitimacy and security-in early Ming China's policies 
toward the Mongols? Yes, except that Sino-Mongolian relations were much more 
confrontational and that Chinese rulers also frequently resorted to the strategy of 
war. 
The prominence of war should not be surprising. The Ming and the Mongols 
were bitter enemies as the Ming dynasty was established after overthrowing the 
Yuan and expelling the Mongols from China proper. The Mongols remained a 
serious threat in two ways. First, their incursions into the Ming frontier constituted 
a physical security threat. In the 1370s the Northern Yuan still vaguely hoped to 
restore dynastic rule in the south. Second, the Mongol pretension to continuing 
Yuan rule posed a legitimacy threat to the Ming regime. 
Hong\VU hoped for a formal ac1mowledgment of Ming superiority from the 
Northern Yuan ruler Ayushiridara and a renunciation of the latter's claim to the 
imperial throne (Dreyer 1982, 74). After the 1370 campaigns which successfully 
established Ming rule in eastern Inner Mongolia and the Gansu corridor, Hong\VU 
in July and November of the same year sent rescripts urging Ayushiridara to 
submit. But Ayushiridara and other prominent Mongol leaders held their ground, 
compelling Hongwu to try both war and diplomacy. In 1372 the emperor ordered 
a massive campaign to conquer all Mongolia. The campaign ended in a major 
failure, forcing the Ming to adopt a largely defensive posture in the next few years. 
Meanwhile Hongvro intensified diplomatic efforts. He sent envoys to Ayushiridara 
and senior Yuan officials to persuade and induce them to submit. But the Mongols 
were still unimpressed and the Ming had to resume military expeditions. In 1387, 
the Ming managed to receive surrender from Naghachu, the most prominent 
Regionalization in the TIanxia? 27 
Mongol leader in Manchuria. Shortly afterwards Hongwu decided to take on the 
remaining Mongol resistance-that of the Northern Yuan court in the Mongolian 
steppe. In 1388 the Ming army largely achieved this objective by destroying the 
unity of the Northern Yuan (Zhang and Yu 2004, 6833; Dreyer 1982, 143). 
The Yongle emperor had to deal with a bipolar Mongol world divided between 
the Eastern Mongols led by Arughtai and the Oirats led by Mahmud. In the 
first few years Yongle tried to persuade and induce both camps to submit as his 
tributaries. Initially he was patient with the Mongol defiance, but when in 1408 
his envoy was killed by the Eastern Mongols he decided to retaliate. He invested 
Mahmud who came to present tribute at this time, thus keeping the Oirats on his 
side in the upcoming campaign against the Eastern Mongols. In March 1410 he 
embarked on his first Mongolian campaign. Arughtai was defeated, then sent an 
envoy to present tribute horses to the Ming court Although Yongle knew that the 
tributes from Arughtai and Mahmud did not reflect their ''true submission," he 
nevertheless allowed their pretense to continue. Such "submission," pretended or 
othenvise, was at least useful for demonstrating his superiority over them. 
Yet peaceful tributary relations were also the cause of trouble. Mahrnud, 
benefited from years of tributary relations with the Ming and the defeat of 
Arughtai, became so restless and defiant that Yongle felt it necessary to destroy 
him by force. In waging another personal expedition in 1414, Yongle was not so 
much concerned with Mahrnud's "insincerity", which he knew all along, as with 
the Oirats' increasing defiance, growing power, and their capability to do damage 
to the northern frontier. The pattern would repeat itself in Ming relations with the 
Eastern Mongols. The defeat of Mahmud by the Ming army again disrupted the 
balance of power in the steppe. Strengthening his horde from years of tributary 
relations with the Ming, Arughtai again tried to harass the Chinese and establish 
hegemony in the steppe. During 1422-1424, Yongle launched three additional 
campaigns againstArughtai to eliminate the threat posed by the rise of the Eastern 
Mongol power. 
A "community o!practice"? 
Did East Asia during the early Ming embody a "community of practice" (Adler 
2005)? According to Adler (2008, 196), "communities of practice" refer to 
"likeminded groups of practitioners who are informally as" well as contextually 
bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice." Since 
the concept is broad and expansive-so defined, "communities of practice are 
everywhere" (Adler 2008, 200)--the early Ming East Asian order can also be 
interpreted as a form of a community of practice. Indeed, one is easily tempted 
to conceive of it as a "sinocentric tributary community." Such an argument could 
be conveniently made from a standard tribute system perspective: The apparent 
tributary practices between China"' and its neighbors formed a community mediated 
through the institution of the tribute system. Two points, however, should be 
noted. They do not dispute the conception of the early Ming East Asian order as a 
." 
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community of practice per se, but call into question the nature of such practice-
i.e., how "sinocentric" such practice in fact was, and bow accurately a "sinocentric 
tributary community" reflects the nature of the larger relations between China and 
its neighbors. 
Adler (2008, 196) argues that practices, the background knowledge that 
constitutes them, and the environment in which they are performed make possible 
the socialization and persuasion of political actors. There is no question that by 
sending envoys to neighboring countries, early Ming emperors wanted to persuade 
and socialize foreign rulers into accepting the sinocentric conceptions of world 
order. They also expected China's cultural excellence to somehow transform 
foreigners into accepting Chinese norms and worldviews. Such socialization 
attempts, as already indicated, emerged from the domestic political linkage between 
the legitimacy needs of early Ming rulers 'and their sinocentric identity informed 
by past experiences. Yet, it is far less clear what outcomes these socialization 
efforts in fact achieved. Foreign rulers-including those most amenable to 
Chinese influence, such as the Koreans-rarely fully internalized sinocentrism 
or voluntarily served as China's tributaries during the early Ming (Zhang 2009). 
Tributary practices, therefore, frequently failed to change the social structure into 
a sinocentric one in the sense that major political actors in the system collectively 
believed in Chinese centrality and superiority. 
A second reason why the label "a sinocentric tributary community" can be 
misleading is that tributary practices were not the whole story of regional politics. 
Indeed, in terms of Sino-Japanese and Sino-Mongolian relations, tributary 
relations were not even the major part of the story. The Japanese and the Mongols 
at various points simply rejected such relations. This is one reason why a tribute 
system perspective is not as useful as it might seem. Moreover, how would one 
put the Chinese strategies, of war, blaclanail, and inducement into a community 
of practice informed by sinocentric tributary norms? The claim here is not that 
there was no common practice-tributary relations initiated by China were clearly 
present-but that tributary practices were not the only kind of practice going on. 
We need to examine what and how much such tributary practices can tell us about 
the nature of regional politics during the early Ming. 
Socialization, then and now 
Is an historical perspective as outlined above helpful for thinking about contem-
porary Chinese foreign policy, particularly socialization in its regionalization 
strategies? Scholars have typically focused on how China has been socialized by 
international norms and institutions (Johnston 2008). The question of whether 
China is also socializing other states is therefore an interesting and yet somewhat 
neglected one. 
Shakespeare once noted that "comparisons are odious," and this seems 
particularly pertinent to historical comparisons. There are, at least, two reasons 
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that make it difficult to infer the trajectories of current or future Chinese foreign 
policy from history. First, the regional and international context in which China 
finds itself today bas cbanged dramatically. Both the agency and the structure of 
the East Asian system have been transformed in the past two hundreds of years. 
China is no longer the dominant power in the system, foreign policy norms are 
now diverse and in some cases heavily influenced by Western practices, and extra-
regional factors sucb as globalization and the US military presence play important 
roles in regional politics and economics. Nobody would be so naive as to expect the 
return of a sinocentric tributary order, if such a "Chinese world order" (Fairbank 
1968) ever accurately captures the realities of historical East Asian politics. 
Second, the past does not offer straightforward lessons because China's 
historical statecraft was informed not by one but several traditions simultaneously 
(Hunt 1984). Many Cbinese scbolars believe that China had a dominant 
tradition of Confucian pacifism. This is incorrect and parochial. Confucianism 
promotes morality and benevolence, yet Legalism emphasizes the importance of 
power and punishment, and these are just two among China's many schools of 
thoughts developed in the ancient Chinese world. Sometimes China displayed 
a pacifistic approach in foreign affairs, yet during other periods China appeared 
highly opportunistic in realizing its self-interest through power politics. At times 
China appeared to be a factor for peace in East Asia, yet often it also disrupted 
regional stability. Will contemporary China be peaceful? Will it seek begemony 
and domination in East Asia? No useful answer can be given to such simplistic 
questions because from a historical perspective, there was simply no single pattern 
of Chinese foreign policy. As Victoria Hui has pointed out, the coexistence of 
realpolitik and idealpolitik impulses in traditional Chinese foreign policy makes 
any simple line,ar projection from China's past to the future misguided (Hui 2008, 
63). 
History, however, can offer useful perspectives if historical reasoning is used 
with caution. It can, for example, suggest clues for thinking about the question 
of socialization in Chinese foreign policy. The above historical analysis shows 
that early Ming rulers tried to initiate tributary relations with foreign countries by 
reminding them of tributary norms and persuading them of Chinese superiority. 
Such socialization by way of persuasion stemmed out of the domestic political 
linkage between legitimacy needs and their sinocentric identity;. Early Ming 
emperors tried in varying degrees to convince foreign rulers of Cbiria's centrality 
and superiority and of the "moral correctness" for them to pay tribute. This was 
first 'of all a matter of foreign recognition of the founding of a new regime in 
China-and extremely important given the fact that Hongwu established his rule 
through a violent struggle with the Mongol Yuan and that Yongle in fact usurped 
the throne from the legitimate Jianwen emperor. In some cases the recognition 
game went longer and deeper. In §ino-Korean relations, for example, Hongwu 
tried to sever Korea's relations with the Northern Yuan and only succeeded in the 
late l380s. 
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One question we might ask about the People's Republic of China (PRC) is 
therefore: What are the domestic linkages between the needs of the PRe regime and 
its identity conceptions that might lead to socialization efforts in its foreign policy? 
Socialization is not merely persuasion; persuasion is a strategy or mechanism that 
might lead to a high degree of socialization. Successful socialization must result 
in the internalization of values, roles, and understandings among the targets of 
socialization so that they assume a ''taken-for-grantedness'' (Johnston 2008, 21-
22). 
In the post-Cold War world Beijing his been trying to persuade other countries 
that it is a force for stability and prosperity in East Asia. Although initially 
regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum are where China has 
been socialized, the socialization effects may work both ways-ASEAN states 
may be changed by China's participation as well (Ba 2006, (62). It increasingly 
appears that China is trying to socialize other countries into accepting its role 
as a responsible and peaceful great power by offering political and economic 
cooperation in "ASEAN plus" institutions and by taking an active stance in 
diplomatic initiatives such as the Six Party Talks. In the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization and to a lesser extent the East Asian Summit, China has taken a 
leading role in facilitating regional initiatives. 
Surely policies in these areas are motivated by a variety of considerations; the 
link: between socialization and identity is nevertheless important A key question 
for future Chinese foreign policy is how the identity of a "responsible great power" 
might shape China's socialization attempts and influence its overall foreign policy 
evolution. If the discourse of ''responsible great power" is no cheap talk (as it 
appears for the time being), it ought to have important behavioral implications. 
Given the awareness that the PRe has elicited suspicion and fear among its 
neighbors in the past and that its rising power is again causing anxieties in the 
region, Chinese leaders might initiate more socialization attempts to alleviate 
these concerns. As yet we know little about what a "responsible great power" 
identity actually means and how it might manifest itselfin foreign policy behavior. 
Indeed, the Chinese themselves are trying to figure out how China as responsible 
great power ought to behave in the international arena. 
Socialization might become an increasingly prominent aspect of Chinese 
foreign policy in another important sense having directly to do with its history. 
As China's power continues to grow, the recent past of the so~called "'century of 
humiliation" will have less relevance for its foreign policy than the more distant 
past of imperial glory. Indeed, Chinese analysts have for several years been calling 
for a "great power mentality" to replace the '''victim mentality." Michael Hunt 
speculated long ago that "The rise in appeal of the imperial past seems likely to 
happen in any case, for it offers the only indigenous benchmark for measuring 
progress toward a position of restored national power and pride" (Hunt 1984, 
38). 
If the influence of the imperial past has not been readily observable in 
Chinese foreign policy behavior, it has already manifested itself in scholarly and 
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popular discourse. Some Chinese scholars have already called for reexamining 
China's past and preparing for China's growing role in international affairs in the 
contemporary world by drawing lessons from the past. The past they are talking 
about is no longer the "century of humiliation." Indeed, according to one analyst, 
the "century of humiliation" is but an aberration from the normal trajectory of 
Chinese history, mystified all the more by Eurocentric perspectives since the late 
nineteenth century (Xiang 2007). According to the philosopher Zhao Tingyang 
(2005), who wrote a popular book that fascinated China's international relations 
scholars, the historical East Asian order centering on China provides an almost 
perfect model for the future world order. It is argued that compared with Western 
ideas, traditional Chinese thought, by virtue of its emphasis on peace and harmony, 
is a superior source for thinking about the future world order. These scholars are 
now calling for the Chinese to "rethink China," to start an ideological debate with 
the West, and to think about how China can contribute to the making of the future 
world order. 
Admittedly many substantive arguments these scholars ma1ce can be challenged 
for various reasons. As mentioned, harmony is not the only feature in traditional 
Chinese culture, nor is peace in traditional Chinese foreign policy. The alleged 
Chinese superiority in these areas in the imperial past may be just as much myth 
as Chinese "inferiority" since the mid-nineteenth century. Yet the significance of 
their arguments lies not so much in their validity as in how they, embedded in a 
network of knowledge production in the Chinese intellectual community, might be 
able to influence official foreign policy ideas (Callahan 2008). As Chinese elites 
reexamine history and evaluate contemporary situations, they will increasingly see 
China as possessing a distinctive, ifnot always superior, set of history, culture, and 
value for the management of international affairs. As a result, we can expect to see 
more Chinese socialization about Chinese approaches in managing regional and 
international issues. As Chinese foreign policy becomes more proactive, so will its 
socialization attempts in a variety of institutional settings. 
Meanwhile, of course, other countries and non-state actors will continue to try 
socializing and persuading China to behave more to their liking. These countries 
will want to see China become a "responsible great power." And since China has 
already declared its intention to become a "responsible great power," the question 
becomes where and how these conceptions of China as a "responsible great 
power" differ and converge. In the coming years, we will likely see an interesting 
pattern of increasing adjustment and adaptation of the different "worldviews" in 
the interactions between China and other countries. 
Conclusion 
Chinese rulers in imperial times tried to socialize foreign rulers into accepting their 
centrality and superiority in the surrounding world and construct a sinocentric 
world order. Socialization and persuasion is not the only aspect of imperial Chinese 
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foreign policy. In the early Ming Chinese rulers also employed the strategies of war. 
blaclanail, and inducement. But socialization was always present because it grew 
out of the domestic political linkage between legitimacy needs and the sinocentric 
identity. Thinking about socialization in contemporary Chinese foreign policy, one 
can begin by considering how the identity of contemporary China might lead to 
distinctive socialization attempts. History's relevance is in providing sources for 
the construction of an evolving Chinese identity in the contemporary world. 
As Chinese power continues to grow, as Chinese foreign policy becomes 
more proactive, and as China replaces the "victim mentality" with a "great power 
mentality," socialization will become an increasingly prominent aspect in its 
foreign policy. Such socialization will of course no longer be about sinocentrism. 
We have no way of knowing its exact content since China's national identity will 
continue to evolve in the twenty-first century. VJhat we can be sure, however, is that 
China will increasingly advance its own distinctive worldviews on international 
affairs and will no longer be content with simply being socialized by other actors 
in the international system. 
